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ODPADE ZARADI BOLEZNI: Prof. Matjaž Perc: Phase transitions towards fairness in human bargaining

Datum objave: 27. 10. 2014
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Ponedeljek, 3. november 2014, ob 16:15 v predavalnici F1, FMF UL, Jadranska 19, Ljubljana

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Povzetek:  

      Phase transitions towards fairness in human bargaining

      Prof. Matjaž Perc , Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko, Univerza v Mariboru

Imagine two players having to share a sum of money. One proposes a split, and the other can either agree with it or not. No haggling is allowed. If there is an agreement, the sum is shared according to the proposal. If not, both players remain empty handed. This is the blueprint of the ultimatum game. Seminal experiments on ultimatum bargaining have revealed that humans are remarkably fond of fair play. When asked to share something, unfair offers are rare and their acceptance rate is small. Traditionally, the ultimatum game has been studied with continuous strategies, and it has been shown that empathy and spatiality may lead to the evolution of fairness.

However, evolutionary games with continuous strategies often hide the true complexity of the problem, because solutions that would be driven by pattern formation are unstable. Discrete strategies in the ultimatum game open the gate to fascinatingly rich dynamical behavior. The highly webbed phase diagram, which features both continuous and discontinuous phase transitions as well as a tri-critical point, reveals the hidden complexity behind the pursuit of human fair play.